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Abstract
We present a general equilibrium model of the global oil market, in which the oil price, oil production,
and consumption, are jointly determined as outcomes of the optimizing decisions of oil importers and
oil exporters. On the supply side the oil market is modelled as a dominant ﬁrm – Saudi Aramco – with
competitive fringe. We establish that a dominant ﬁrm may exist as long as it enjoys a cost advantage over
the fringe. We provide an expression for the optimal markup and compute the spare capacity maintained
by such a ﬁrm. The model produces plausible dynamics in response to oil supply and oil demand shocks.
In particular, it reproduces successfully the jump in oil output of Saudi Aramco following the output
collapse of Iraq and Kuwait during the ﬁrst Gulf War, explaining it as the proﬁt-maximizing response
of the dominant ﬁrm. Oil taxes and subsidies aﬀect the oil price and welfare through their eﬀect on the
trade-oﬀ between oil production eﬃciency and oil market competition.
Keywords: oil price, oil production, dominant ﬁrm, Saudi Aramco, oil tax
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, Q435
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Non-Technical Summary
An extensive literature studies the transmission of oil price shocks assuming that the oil price
is given exogenously. Yet oil price shocks do not happen in isolation. Rather, like other relative
price changes, they are triggered by deeper shocks to preferences, technology, and policy. The
international oil price is determined, jointly with the oil quantity produced and consumed, as
an equilibrium outcome of the interaction of diﬀerent market participants. Indeed, Barsky and
Kilian (2002, 2004), and Kilian (2009), have found overwhelming evidence that the oil price
is aﬀected signiﬁcantly by global economic conditions. This is important both from a positive
point of view, as shown by Kilian (2009), and from a normative perspective, as demonstrated
by Nakov and Pescatori (2010) in the context of monetary policy.
Despite all this evidence, few equilibrium models determine the oil price, and even fewer
determine endogenously both the oil price and the oil quantity. This paper presents a general
equilibrium framework designed to approximate the industrial structure of the oil market, while
jointly determining the oil price, oil production and oil consumption, as equilibrium outcomes
of the optimizing decisions of oil importers and oil exporters. On the supply side we model
the oil market as a dominant ﬁrm with competitive fringe, in the spirit of Salant (1976). We
build this industrial organization model into a general equilibrium framework, assuming that
the dominant ﬁrm internalizes the behavioral responses of fringe producers and oil consumers.
Thus, the dominant ﬁrm in our model internalizes the fact that a change in its oil output and
its demand for inputs aﬀects oil demand, the supply of fringe producers, and the oil price.
We calibrate our dominant ﬁrm to data on Aramco, the 100% state-owned oil company of
Saudi Arabia. As Adelman (1995) and Alhajji and Huettner (2000) convincingly argue, the
behavior of Aramco can hardly be described as competitive: it is by far the largest oil ﬁrm in
the world, accounting for more than a tenth of global oil production and a ﬁfth of total proven
reserves. Even though it has the lowest production costs, it is the only ﬁrm which maintains
ample spare capacity and restricts investment in developing available reserves (Smith, 2009).
Moreover, its output is negatively correlated with that of other OPEC producers (ibid.). Indeed,
its output has been highly volatile compared to other major producers, even though Aramco
itself has experienced few shocks aﬀecting its production directly.
We use our model to address three sets of questions. First, in Section 3 we derive a set
of analytical results related to the secular features of the economy that are independent of
the particular calibration. Namely, the technological conditions required for the existence of a
dominant oil ﬁrm, its degree of capacity utilization, and the conditions for balanced growth.
We establish that a dominant ﬁrm may exist proﬁtably as long as it enjoys a permanent cost
advantage with respect to the fringe, and we oﬀer an expression for the optimal markup as
a function of this technological advantage. We also ﬁnd that such a ﬁrm would optimally
maintain spare capacity relative to the fringe, and that the oil price must grow over time to
sustain balanced growth.
Second, in Section 4 we study the dynamic properties of our calibrated economy. With only
two productivity shocks (one aﬀecting the output of the oil-importing region and the other that
of fringe producers), the model is capable of reproducing the monthly volatility of the oil price,
of the oil output of Aramco and that of the fringe, as well as of US industrial production. We
show that the co-movement between the oil price and value added of the oil-importing region
may be positive or negative depending on the origin of the shock. We then evaluate the model’s
performance relative to the data in one particular episode, the ﬁrst Persian Gulf War. The
model reproduces quite well the more than 50% jump in the output of Saudi Arabia in response6
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to the combined output collapse of Iraq and Kuwait, as well as the initial jump of the oil price
from $19 to $34 per barrel. From the point of view of our model, this behavior of the dominant
ﬁrm is entirely consistent with its own proﬁt-maximizing objective, as opposed to alternative
non-economic (e.g. foreign policy) considerations. It is optimal for the dominant ﬁrm to increase
its output substantially, but not so much as to fully oﬀset the output collapse of the fringe, so
that the oil price rises in tandem with oil sales. Our model thus explains the high volatility
of Aramco’s oil output as the endogenous response to shocks aﬀecting fringe producers and oil
importers.
Finally, since the economy is distorted by the market power of the dominant ﬁrm, in Section
5 we assess the desirability, from the point of view of the oil-importing region, of two policy
interventions: a tax on oil consumption, and a subsidy to oil production by the fringe. Unlike
partial equilibrium settings assuming an exogenous oil price, our framework is well suited for
tracing the general equilibrium eﬀects of these measures, working through the endogenously
determined price of oil. We ﬁnd that an oil consumption tax is not necessarily welfare improving,
and that its eﬀects depend on whether there are constant or decreasing returns to scale in oil
production. In particular, in the presence of constant returns, an oil production subsidy to the
fringe does a better job at mitigating the market distortion than an oil consumption tax. The
optimal subsidy to fringe production strikes a balance between reducing the market power of
the dominant ﬁrm and allocating resources to the more eﬃcient oil production technology.7
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1. Introduction
An extensive literature studies the transmission of oil price shocks assuming these are given
exogenously, typically as an AR(1) driving process (e.g. Kim and Loungani, 1992; Leduc and
Sill, 2004; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2005). Yet oil price shocks do not happen in isolation. Rather,
like other relative price changes, they are triggered by deeper shocks to preferences, technology,
and policy. The international oil price is determined, jointly with the oil quantity produced
and consumed, as an equilibrium outcome of the interaction of dierent market participants.
Indeed, Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004), and Kilian (2009), have found overwhelming evidence
that the oil price is aected signicantly by global economic conditions. This is important both
from a positive point of view, as shown by Kilian (2009), and from a normative perspective, as
demonstrated by Nakov and Pescatori (2010) in the context of monetary policy.
Despite all this evidence, few equilibrium models treat the oil price as endogenous, and
even fewer determine endogenously both the oil price and the oil quantity. Recent progress
includes papers by Bodenstein et. al. (2011), and Leduc and Sill (2007), in which the oil price
is determined endogenously while oil supply is given as an exogenous endowment. Backus and
Crucini (2000) partially endogenize also oil output by modelling it as the sum of two terms: an
exogenous shock meant to represent unpredictable OPEC supply changes; and a term related
to economic activity, which represents competitive oil supply.
This paper presents a general equilibrium framework designed to approximate the industrial
structure of the oil market, while jointly determining the oil price, oil production and consump-
tion, as equilibrium outcomes of the optimizing decisions of oil importers and oil exporters. On
the supply side we model the oil market as a dominant rm with competitive fringe, in the spirit
of Salant (1976).1 He used a similar setup to study the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in which the
dominant rm takes as given the output path of the competitive fringe. Instead, we build this
industrial organization model into a general equilibrium framework, assuming that the dominant
rm internalizes  a la Stackelberg the behavioral responses of fringe producers and oil consumers.
Thus, the dominant rm in our model understands and exploits the fact that its oil output and
demand for inputs aects the supply of fringe producers, oil demand, and the oil price.
The focus of our paper is thus on explaining the behavior of the dominant rm and on
the distortionary eects it has on the global oil market. It diers from that of Backus and
Crucini, who emphasize the terms of trade eects of exogenous oil endowment shocks, and from
Bodenstein et. al. who focus on the real exchange rate and the trade balance. Hassler et. al.
(2010) solve the problem of a single monopolist, analyzing the implications for climate change.
In contrast, we study the problem of a dominant rm with a large competitive fringe, focusing
on the implications for business cycle dynamics. In particular, although any individual fringe
rm is small and has no impact on the oil price, collectively fringe producers limit substantially
the market power of the dominant rm.
We calibrate our dominant rm to data on Saudi Aramco, the 100% state-owned oil company
of Saudi Arabia. As Adelman (1995) and Alhajji and Huettner (2000) convincingly argue, the
behavior of Aramco can hardly be described as competitive: it is by far the largest oil rm in
the world (see Table 1), accounting for more than a tenth of global oil production and a fth
of total proven reserves. Even though it has the lowest production costs, it is the only rm
which maintains ample spare capacity and restricts investment in developing available reserves
1In the energy literature the \dominant rm with competitive fringe" view of the oil industry is quite common.
Examples include Mabro (1975), Adelman (1986, 1995), Alhajji and Huettner (2000a,b), Almoguera and Herrera
(2007).8
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(Smith, 2009).2 Moreover, its output is negatively correlated with that of other OPEC producers
(ibid.). Indeed, its output has been highly volatile compared to other major producers, even
though Aramco itself has experienced few shocks aecting its production directly (Fig.1).3
We use our model to address three sets of questions. First, in Section 3 we derive a set
of analytical results related to the secular features of the economy that are independent of
the particular calibration. Namely, the technological conditions required for the existence of a
dominant oil rm, its degree of capacity utilization, and the conditions for balanced growth.
We establish that a dominant rm may exist protably as long as it enjoys a permanent cost
advantage with respect to the fringe, and we oer an expression for the optimal markup as a
function of this technological advantage. We also nd that such a rm would optimally maintain
spare capacity relative to the fringe.
Second, in Section 4 we study the dynamic properties of our calibrated economy. With only
two productivity shocks, aecting the output of the oil-importing region and of fringe producers,
the model is capable of reproducing the monthly volatility of the oil price, of the oil output of
Aramco and that of the fringe, as well as of US industrial production. We show that the co-
movement between the oil price and GDP of the oil-importing region may be positive or negative
depending on the origin of the shock. We then evaluate the model's performance relative to the
data in one particular episode, the rst Persian Gulf War. The model reproduces quite well
the more than 50% jump in the output of Saudi Arabia in response to the combined output
collapse of Iraq and Kuwait, as well as the initial jump of the oil price from $19 to $34 per barrel.
From the point of view of our model, this behavior of the dominant rm is entirely consistent
with its own prot-maximizing objective, as opposed to alternative non-economic (e.g. foreign
policy) considerations. It is optimal for the dominant rm to increase its output substantially,
but not so much as to fully oset the output collapse of the fringe, so that the oil price rises in
tandem with oil sales. Our model thus explains the high volatility of Aramco's oil output as the
endogenous response to shocks aecting fringe producers and oil importers.
Finally, since the economy is distorted by the market power of the dominant rm, in Section
5 we assess the desirability, from the point of view of the oil-importing region, of two policy
interventions: a tax on oil consumption, and a subsidy to oil production by the fringe. Unlike
partial equilibrium settings assuming an exogenous oil price, our framework is well suited for
tracing the general equilibrium eects of these measures, working through the endogenously
determined price of oil. We nd that an oil consumption tax is not necessarily welfare improving,
and that its eects depend on whether there are constant or decreasing returns to scale in oil
production. In particular, in the presence of constant returns, an oil production subsidy to the
fringe does a better job at mitigating the market distortion than an oil consumption tax. The
optimal subsidy to fringe production strikes a balance between reducing the market power of
the dominant rm and allocating resources to the more ecient oil production technology.
2According to the International Energy Agency, Aramco's spare capacity in 2009 stood at 25%. To put this
in perspective, it is equivalent to the entire production of oil-exporting countries such as Kuwait or Venezuela.
3According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration's \Ocial oil market chronology", the only in-
stances when Saudi oil production was directly aected by exogenous events were a re at the Abqaiq facilities
which halved production in 1977, the \tanker war" in 1984, when several Saudi tankers were destroyed, and the
attacks in 1991 by Iraqi missiles during the rst Gulf War. Apart from these singular episodes, changes in Saudi
oil production were the result of business decisions, and not the consequence of exogenous disruptions to their
production capabilities.9
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2. Model
Our model of the global oil market comprises three regions: one oil-importing and two oil-
exporting. The oil-importing region employs labor in the production of nal goods, part of which
are consumed domestically, and the rest are exported to the two oil-producing regions. The oil-
importing region imports oil for use in consumption. The inclusion of oil as a consumption
good rather than as a factor of production is in part motivated by Kilian (2008). His estimates
suggest that the primary channel of transmission of oil price shocks to the economy is through
their eect on households' demand for goods and services, rather than as an input in production.
In addition, this is a simple way of postulating inelastic oil demand, which is key for matching
the high oil price volatility (relative to oil consumption volatility) observed in the data.
Oil is a homogeneous commodity supplied by a dominant rm and a fringe of competitive
oil producers. The fringe take the oil price as given when choosing their production level. The
dominant rm faces a downward sloping residual demand curve and picks the prot-maximizing
points on that curve at each point in time and in each state of nature. Oil exporters produce
oil only and their revenue is recirculated to the oil-importing region in the form of demand for
nal consumption and investment goods.
Our model of the oil industry is in the spirit of Salant (1976) who used a similar structure to
study the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in which the dominant rm takes as given the output path
of the fringe. Instead, we build this industrial structure into a general equilibrium framework,
assuming that the dominant rm is aware that it can manipulate  a la Stackelberg the choices
both of the competitive fringe, and of the oil importer. For example, the dominant rm under-
stands that a change in its own oil supply and demand for goods from the oil-importing region
will have an impact on oil demand, oil supply by fringe producers, and the oil price.
Except for the dierence in market power, which is founded on a technological gap between
the two types of oil producers, the competitive fringe and the dominant rm are modelled
symmetrically. This implies that, by appropriate choice of parameters of the oil production
technology, our model spans the space from the extreme case of perfect competition to the
opposite extreme of single monopoly. Our preferred calibration is one in which the dominant oil
producer maintains an average market share of 12%, which corresponds roughly to the market
share of Saudi Arabia since 1973.
2.1. Oil-importing region
A representative household has a period utility function which depends on consumption, Ct,
oil Ot, and labor Lt; and takes the form
U(C;O;L) = log(C) + tO1 =(1   )   L1+ =(1 +  );
where  and   are oil demand and labor supply elasticities. We allow for a trend in t to capture
some secular features of the data, while ensuring the existence of a balanced growth path.
The household faces the period budget constraint
Ct + stOt = wtLt + Dt; (1)
which equates income from labor, wtLt, and dividends from the ownership of rms, Dt, to
outlays on consumption, Ct, and oil, stOt; st denotes the real price of oil, while wt denotes the
real wage rate. We assume that all oil must be consumed within the period of production.4
4As Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) point out, oil storage \above ground" is limited because of the high
physical storage cost. Most of the oil \stored" above ground is oil in transit in pipelines or tankers. Relaxing this
assumption to allow for delay between production and consumption does not aect signicantly our main results.10
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subject to the budget constraint (1), where 0 <  < 1 is a time preference parameter.
Final goods are produced with labor only by a representative price-taking rm, according to
Yt = ZtL
t (2)
with   1: Aggregate total factor productivity Zt follows an AR(1) process in log dierences:
^ gz
t = z^ gz
t 1 + "z
t, where ^ gz
t  gz
t   gz; with gz
t  log(Zt=Zt 1); gz = E(gz
t) and "z
t is a Gaussian
innovation with mean zero and variance 2
z.




and labor supply curve
CtL
 
t = wt: (4)
Prot maximization by price-taking rms yields the following labor demand curve
wtLt = Yt: (5)
Barring borrowing across regions, nal goods consumption equals gross domestic product
net of the value of oil imports
Ct = Yt   stOt: (6)
2.2. Competitive fringe of oil exporters






t=0 t log( ~ Ct)
subject to the period budget constraint
~ Ct + ~ It = ~ rt ~ Kt 1 + ~ Dt
where consumption, ~ Ct, and investment, ~ It, are both purchased from the oil-importing region,
~ rt is the rental price of capital ~ Kt rented out by the household to oil rms, and ~ Dt are oil rm
dividends rebated lump sum to the household.
The household invests in capital according to
~ Kt = (1   ) ~ Kt 1 + ~ It;
where  is the depreciation rate of installed capital.6
5We decorate variables belonging to the competitive fringe by tildes (e.g. ~ Xt), and variables belonging to the
dominant rm by hats (e.g. ^ Xt).
6We abstract from the existence of signicant technological lags in the buildup of oil production capital, leaving
the analysis of this feature for future work.11
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A representative fringe rm, owned by the household, maximizes period prots
~ Dt = max
~ Xt; ~ Kt 1

st ~ Ot   ~ Xt   ~ rt ~ Kt 1

subject to the production technology





taking the oil price as given. The rm buys the intermediate good ~ Xt from the oil-importing re-
gion, and rents the capital ~ Kt from the household. Total factor productivity ~ Zt = ~ At ~ Z0 exp(g~ zt)
follows an exogenous process with a secular trend component ~ Z0 exp(g~ zt), and a stationary
AR(1) component in logs, log( ~ At) =  ~ A log( ~ At 1) + "
~ A
t with persistence  ~ A and a Gaussian
innovation "
~ A
t with mean zero and variance 2
~ A.
Optimal oil supply by competitive fringe producers implies
~ st = ~ Xt= ~ Ot; (8)






(1   ~ )st+1
~ Ot+1
~ Kt
+ (1   )
!#
:
2.3. Dominant oil exporter
The dominant producer's economy has a structure symmetric to that of fringe producers,
except that there is a single oil rm. The rm produces oil, ^ Ot, according to





using an imported intermediate good ^ Xt and capital ^ Kt 1: We assume that the dominant rm's
technology evolves deterministically according to ^ Zt = ^ Z0 exp(g^ zt), that is, unlike the fringe, the
dominant rm's output is not directly aected by productivity shocks. Capital is accumulated by
purchasing ^ It units of the investment good from the oil-importing region and the representative
household receives a stream of log utility from consumption ^ Ct.
The substantial dierence with the competitive fringe is that the dominant oil rm has
market power: it is aware of the dependence of fringe oil supply, of oil demand, and of the
equilibrium oil price on its supply decision. We assume that the dominant rm chooses a state-
contingent plan which maximizes the expected present discounted utility of its owners, subject
to the optimal behavior of households and rms in the oil-importing region, of competitive fringe
producers, and clearing in the oil market.
Thus, the decision problem of the dominant oil producer is to
maxEo
X1
t=0 t log( ^ Ct)
subject to demand equations (2)-(6), fringe production (7), (8), its production technology (9)
and the oil market clearing condition7
Ot = ^ Ot + ~ Ot:
Equilibrium is dened as the solution to the above problem under commitment. The set of
rst-order conditions is given in appendix B.
7We assume that the dominant rm has limited information and does not internalize the capital accumulation
condition of competitive fringe producers.12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1354
June 2011
3. Secular features of the oil market
This section describes the balanced-growth properties of the model. In particular, it focuses
on the long-run trends of the oil price and oil consumption eciency consistent with balanced
growth, as well as on the optimal oil price markup and capacity utilization of the dominant oil
rm.
3.1. Oil prices and eciency
The model incorporates secular trends in the growth rate of nal goods technology (Zt),
oil production technology ( ~ Zt and ^ Zt), and oil eciency (t). In a steady-state with balanced
growth, the ratio stOt=Yt must remain stable over time. Since Ot grows at rate gz + g~ z; while
Yt grows at rate gz; for the ratio stOt=Yt to remain stable, st should grow at rate  g~ z. This is
summarized in the following balanced-growth-path
Condition 1 The real price of oil st grows at rate  g~ z over time.
The variable t scales the utility of consumption of oil in terms of the utility of consumption
of nal goods. One of the rst-order optimality conditions is the oil demand curve, tCt = stO

t .
Along the balanced growth path, Ct grows at rate gz while stO

t grows at rate 
 
gz + g~ z
 
g~ z. Hence, along the balanced growth path t must grow at rate (   1)
 
gz + g~ z
. Assuming
balanced growth, therefore, supposes the following
Condition 2 Oil eciency t grows at rate (   1)
 
gz + g~ z
:
Since in the data the trend in oil production is positive,
 
gz + g~ z
> 0, for values of  > 1;
energy eciency must increase over time.
3.2. Oil price markup and capacity utilization
The dominant oil rm extracts a pure rent by picking the prot-maximizing point on the
residual demand curve, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Thus, one can derive
Proposition 3 The average price mark-up of the dominant oil producer is given by
 = r^  ~ ; (10)
where r = gz= +    1 is the return on capital used in oil production and  = ^ Z0^ ^ (1  
^ )1 ^ =
h
~ Z0~ ~ (1   ~ )1 ~ 
i
is the technological advantage of the dominant rm over the fringe.
Proof. See Appendix A
Corollary 4 In the case in which ~  = ^  (the two technologies are symmetric), a dominant
producer can exist protably as long as it enjoys an average cost advantage, ^ Z0 > ~ Z0:
Proof. See Appendix A
Corollary 5 When ~  = ^ ; the degree of competition is related to the size of the technological
gap ~ Z0= ^ Z0 2 [0;1]: As ~ Z0= ^ Z0  ! 1, the model approaches perfect competition in oil production.
Writing the production function for oil as O = Zu(X;K)K we propose the following13
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Denition 6 The capacity utilization rate of installed capital is given by u(X;K), with u(0;K) =
0, @u=@X > 0; and @2u=@X2 < 0: In the Cobb-Douglas case, u(X;K) = (X=K)
 :
Based on the above denition, we can derive an expression for the capacity utilization of the
dominant oil producer relative to that of the competitive fringe,
u( ^ X; ^ K)=u( ~ X; ~ K) =





~ X= ~ K
~ 
= (^  d MC)
^ 
1 ^ =(~  g MC)
~ 
(1 ~ ); (11)
where g MC and d MC are dened in Appendix A (in equations (17) and (18), respectively). Capac-
ity utilization in the data is computed as the ratio of actual output to \sustainable production
capacity", dened as the production level that can be reached within 30 days and sustained
for 90 days. In the model, capacity utilization is computed from equation (11), assuming that
the competitive fringe operates at 100 percent of capacity. The dominant producer utilizes less
capacity than the fringe as long as the parameters of the model satisfy
(^  g MC)
^ 
1 ^  < (~  g MC)
~ 
(1 ~ ):
4. Quantitative analysis of oil supply and demand shocks
4.1. Calibration
The working frequency of our model is monthly. We calibrate the trend and time preference
parameters as follows. The secular growth rate of technology of the oil-importing region is set
to exp(gz) = 1:031=12, consistent with an average world output growth rate of 3 percent per
year for the period from 1973 to 2009. Given this, we set the time preference parameter to
 = 1:01 1=12 equivalent to an average real interest rate of 4 percent per year.
Based on the stationary market share of Saudi Arabia in the data, we impose equality between
the growth rates of the dominant oil producer and the fringe, g^ z = g~ z. The average growth rate
of total oil production is 0.8 percent per year in the data. In the model this must equal the sum
of the growth rate of oil production inputs, gz, and the growth rate of oil production technology
itself, g~ z, implying a value for exp(g~ z) = 0:9982 on a monthly basis. Given Proposition 1,
the latter implies that the real oil price must grow at an annual rate of 2.2 percent, which is
consistent with the average growth rate actually observed in the data.
Second, we set three parameters governing the oil-importing region's labor disutility, technol-
ogy, and capital depreciation, to their typical values in the RBC literature: the labor disutility
parameter is set to   = 1; the labor share in the production of nal goods is set to  = 0:67;
and the depreciation rate is set to  = 1:101=12   1, consistent with 10% annual depreciation of
installed capital.
Third, we set  = 21, consistent with Smith's (2009) estimates of the short-run price elasticity
of oil demand of about 0.05.
Fourth, we calibrate jointly  and the parameters of the two oil production technologies
( ~ Z0; ^ Z0; ~ ; ^ ;) as follows. We normalize the initial level of productivity of the fringe to ~ Z0 = 1:
We then search for a vector ( ^ Z0; ~ ; ^ ;) which allows the model to match an average \oil share" of
5 percent of GDP, as well as the following three averages for Saudi Arabia: a global market share
of 12.3%, capacity utilization of 75%, and a price mark-up of 25%. We should stress that our
measure of marginal costs includes not only the intermediate input costs but also capital rents.
The targets for Saudi Arabia are calculated in the following way. The market share average is
computed directly from data on oil output provided by the Energy Information Administration
for the period from January 1973 to April 2009. The capacity utilization rate is estimated14
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around 75 percent based on data from IEA (2009). Data on the average markup is hard to
obtain, but we assume it to be around 25 percent based on estimates of long-run marginal costs
provided by IEA. This number is also in line with estimates of the marginal revenue of OPEC
members cited by Smith (2009), who considers it a lower bound for the marginal revenue of
Saudi Arabia. We are able to approximate well these four targets by setting ^ Z0 = 2, ~  = 0:4,
^  = 0:5, and  = 10 10.
With these parameter values, we can compute the permanent consumption loss for the oil-
importing region as a result of the strategic behavior of the dominant rm. From the point of
view of the oil-importing region the optimal allocation is for all oil to be supplied by the lowest-
cost producer at marginal cost. In this hypothetical scenario the superior technology of the
dominant rm is operated under free competition, there is no spare capacity, and oil prots are
competed away. In that case the oil price would be 20% lower on average, oil production 1.1%
higher, and consumption of the oil-importing region would be permanently higher by 0.7%. Over
time, this amounts to a substantial loss of resources wasted on producing oil using the inferior
technology of the fringe.
Finally, in order to analyze the dynamics, we calibrate the two shock processes as follows.8
First, we x the two monthly persistence parameters to Z = 0:944 and  ~ A = 0:944, which
is equivalent to 0.5 on an annual basis.9 We then select the standard deviations of the two
innovations Z = 0:004 and  ~ A = 0:04 so as to best match the monthly standard deviations of
the following ve series: the log-dierences of total oil output, of Aramco's oil output, and of the
fringe oil output; the log-dierence of the real oil price; and the log-dierence of US industrial
production (which we use as a proxy for the output volatility of the oil-importing region as a
whole).
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the t of our model to relevant rst (Table 2) and second (Table
3) moments of the data.10 The model is quite successful at reproducing, with only two shocks,
the historical volatility of the ve series of interest. Namely, while it slightly underpredicts
the volatility of total oil output, and somewhat overpredicts the volatility of total nal goods
output, it matches quite well the historical volatility of the real oil price, Saudi Arabia's oil
production, and fringe output. Key parameters for matching the two most volatile series (the
real oil price and Saudi output) are the low elasticity of oil demand and the higher variable input
share of the dominant oil rm. In particular, the low elasticity of oil demand with respect to the
price produces a highly volatile oil price, while the higher variable-input share of the dominant
rm (relative to the fringe) explains the more volatile output of Saudi Arabia as the result of
maintaining higher average spare capacity.
4.2. Impulse-responses
Figure 2 shows the general equilibrium responses of several variables of interest to each of
the two shocks.
The solid line shows the responses to a one-standard deviation drop in the productivity of
8Ideally, one would like to estimate these processes from the data. Computing them as Solow residuals is
subject to well-known diculties related to the correct measurement of inputs. On the other hand, a full-blown
Bayesian estimation of the model is beyond the scope of this paper.
9We simply pick values for the autoregressive coecients which are consistent with a half-life of one year. This
may overstate somewhat the persistence of the growth rate of US TFP, but we really mean the demand shock to
represent a persistent TFP increase in developing countries such as China, not the US.
10Data on oil supply are taken from the Energy Information Administration's Monthly Energy Review. The
real oil price is the nominal spot West Texas Intermediate price, deated by U.S. CPI. Data on the nominal oil
price, U.S. CPI, and U.S. industrial production are taken from the FRED II online database.15
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the fringe. This is an example of a transitory \negative oil supply shock" with a half-life of
one year. As a result, the oil output of the fringe falls by 1.4% on impact, while the output
of the dominant oil producer increases by as much as 6%, raising its market share by around
0.8 percentage points. The increased production of the dominant oil rm is not sucient to
fully oset the output decline of the fringe; hence, total oil supply falls by around 0.4%, while
the oil price rises by 8%. The latter induces a contraction of domestic consumption in the oil-
importing region by around 0.3 percentage points as oil's share of nal goods output increases.
These impulse-responses are in line with the observed behavior in episodes of \negative oil supply
shocks", for instance during the Iranian revolution and during the rst Gulf war (see gure 1).
In both cases the fall in fringe production { of Iran in the rst episode and Iraq and Kuwait in
the second { was accompanied by a surge in the oil price and a sharp increase in Saudi Arabia's
oil output.
The dashed lines in gure 2 show the responses to a type of \positive oil demand shock",
namely an unexpected one-standard deviation rise in the growth rate of TFP of the oil-importing
region, resulting in a permanent rise of the level of TFP. As a consequence of this shock, the
output of the oil-importing region rises gradually towards its new, higher, balanced growth path,
as does consumption. The oil price at rst rises gradually, peaks at 5% above its balanced growth
path around two years after the initial impulse, and then decays back towards its steady-state
path. Both the fringe oil producers and the dominant oil supplier increase their output, although
the dominant producer does so a bit faster so that its market share slightly increases. These
responses are consistent with episodes of (negative) oil demand shocks such as the dotcom bust
and the sub-prime crisis. In both cases Saudi Arabia reduced signicantly its oil output in
response to dwindling global demand and a falling oil price. In contrast to the supply shock, in
this case the oil price rise is associated with a rise in the GDP of the oil-importing region following
the cumulative rise in its TFP. As pointed out by Kilian (2009), and Nakov and Pescatori (2010),
it is natural that dierent fundamental shocks should induce dierent co-movement between the
oil price, oil supply, and the GDP of the oil-importing region.
The above exercises build condence that our simple model can explain some of the patterns
observed in the data. In particular, the model matches the historical volatilities of oil prices and
quantities, and is able to capture the main co-movements among the series. Prot maximization
on behalf of the dominant producer with spare capacity goes a long way in explaining why Saudi
Arabia increases strongly its output in response to supply disruptions elsewhere, while it reduces
its production aggressively when oil importers are hit by a recession.
4.3. Event study: the Persian Gulf war of 1990-91
In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait on the pretext that Kuwait was stealing oil across the
border by \slant-drilling" into Iraq's Rumaila oil eld. Because of the war and the trade embargo
imposed by the UN, the combined oil supply of the two countries fell by more than 5.3 million
barrels per day (mbd) (see g.1), while the oil price surged from $19 per barrel in July to $34
per barrel in September 1990. The reaction of Saudi Arabia was quite powerful: it raised its
own oil production from 5.4 mbd in July 1990 to 7.6 mbd in September, and to 8.4 mbd by the
end of 1990, a 56% increase in just a few months! Other major oil producers did not increase
their production signicantly: Iran and the US increased their oil output by only 0.2 mbd, while
the Soviet Union actually reduced its production.11
The prevailing hypothesis for the decision of Saudi Arabia to drastically increase its own oil
11A similar pattern of collapsing Iraqi oil supply accompanied by a sizable increase in Saudi Arabia's oil output
was observed also in the second Persian Gulf war of 2003.16
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supply is that it was based on non-economic considerations, such as the desire to support the
already agging US economy facing a war with Iraq (Yergin, 2008). Yet, as we saw in gure
2, this same behavior of increasing its own supply (but not enough to fully oset the impact of
the initial shock on the oil price), is also consistent with the purely economic objective of prot
maximization by the dominant rm. Indeed, given a negative supply shock experienced by the
fringe, it is optimal for the dominant rm to let prots rise through a combined increase of both
the oil price and the quantity of oil sold.
In gure 3 we assess the ability of our model to account quantitatively for this episode. In
particular, we estimate a sequence of shocks to fringe productivity such that the fringe oil output
predicted by the model matches exactly its actual amount in the data (see the top left panel).
We then contrast the actual with the model-implied evolution of Saudi Arabia's oil output, total
oil production, and the real price of oil.
The gure illustrates that the model is quite successful at predicting the actual surge in
Saudi Arabia's oil production, and the fact that this surge was less than sucient to prevent a
decline in total oil output. As for the oil price, the model predicts well the initial jump from
around $20 to around $35 per barrel; after that, however, the model predicts that the oil price
would remain around $35 while the actual oil price gradually fell back to $20 in the course of the
year. Part of the explanation for the subsequent decline of the oil price may be the US recession
from July 1990 to March 1991. This is consistent, from the point of view of our model, with an
autonomous drop in US TFP, a channel which we have deliberately shut down in this exercise.
5. Oil taxes and subsidies in general equilibrium
Finally, we turn to the question of policy. We saw in section 3 that the presence of a dominant
oil rm forces a markup distortion on the global economy. A natural question is whether the oil-
importing region can adopt any suitable scal policies to mitigate this distortion. One possible
policy is raising a tax on oil consumption;12 another is giving an investment subsidy to fringe oil
producers. Here we analyze these possibilities from the perspective of our general equilibrium
model. Since the equilibrium oil price, oil supply, and demand are all likely to be aected by
any oil taxes or subsidies, our model, which endogenously determines these variables, is better
suited to addressing the question of tax incidence than partial equilibrium frameworks which
take the oil price or oil supply as given.
5.1. Fringe investment subsidy: production eciency vs. competition
We rst analyze the case of an oil production subsidy. The latter might work by osetting
what is eectively an oil production tax: the presence of a dominant rm supplying less oil
than the competitive level despite lower costs. The way we implement it is as a subsidy to the
investment good purchased by the competitive fringe to build up oil production capacity. This
implies that the household's budget constraint of the competitive fringe becomes
~ Ct + (1 + )~ It = ~ rt ~ Kt 1 + ~ Dt (12)
with  < 0 denoting an investment subsidy (and  > 0 denoting a tax). We assume that the
resources needed to nance this subsidy are raised in a lump-sum manner from the oil-importing
12See Bergstrom (1982). See also \Raise the Gas Tax" by Gregory Mankiw in The Wall Street Journal, October
20, 2006; as well as the \Pigou Club Manifesto". Mankiw explicitly makes the point that a consumption tax in
the U.S. might be useful for capturing some of the oil rents of Saudi Arabia.17
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region,
Ct + stOt = Yt + Tt (13)
with Tt = ~ It:
Notice that, in principle, such a subsidy can eliminate completely the oil prots of the
dominant rm:
Proposition 7 The oil price markup can be eliminated completely by subsidizing the capital
investment of competitive fringe producers. The subsidy which achieves this is
 =  1 [gz=   (1   )]
~  ^ 
1 ~    1: (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Yet, there is an important tension in the model between reducing the pure rents of the
dominant rm and making use of the more ecient oil production technology. In particular, the
production subsidy which eliminates all oil rents is clearly suboptimal, as it involves a complete
shift of resources from the more ecient to the less ecient oil production technology.
Figure 4 shows that the maximum welfare is achieved for an oil production subsidy of about
17% of the price of investment ( =  0:17), equivalent to 0.5% of the GDP of oil importers. The
subsidy works by lowering the cost of oil production by the competitive fringe, increasing the
global oil supply, and lowering the market share of the dominant rm. Beyond the optimal level,
however, any additional subsidy lowers welfare because of the transfer of resources to the fringe
and the loss of eciency involved in using the inferior oil production technology. Importantly,
the net gains for the oil-importing region of this policy are quite limited: around 0.03% in
terms of domestic consumption, or a net welfare gain equivalent to a permanent increase of
consumption by 0.05%, when accounting for the changes in oil consumption and hours worked.
5.2. Oil consumption tax
To study the eects of a proportional tax on oil consumption, we modify the budget con-
straint of the households of the oil-importing region as follows
Ct + (1 + )stOt = wtLt + Tt; (15)
where (1 + )st is the price of oil paid by the consumer and Tt = stOt is a lump-sum rebate.
In general, it is not clear a priori how the burden of the tax is shared between oil consumers
and oil producers. It is possible, at least in principle, that a higher oil consumption tax, by
discouraging oil consumption, reduces the price of oil so that some of the tax is eectively paid
by oil producers.
Indeed, we nd that oil consumption is discouraged by a positive oil consumption tax (see
Figure 5). Resources previously used for oil consumption are now redirected to more nal goods
consumption and leisure. However, the fact that nal goods consumption increases while labor
hours are reduced does not necessarily imply that welfare rises. Indeed, the utility gain from
increased goods consumption and leisure is more than oset by the loss of utility from less
oil consumption. At the same time, an oil consumption subsidy ( < 0), while increasing oil
consumption and the utility derived thereof, reduces nal goods consumption and leisure in a
way that total utility again is reduced. Thus, in our baseline model with constant returns to
scale in oil production, the optimal oil consumption tax is zero from a welfare point of view,18
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despite the fact that nal goods consumption increases while hours worked fall with a positive
tax.
The above result, however, hinges on the assumption of constant returns to scale in oil pro-
duction. As equation (17) shows, constant returns to scale imply that the oil price is determined
by technological and preference parameters. A production subsidy in the previous case worked
because it lowered the eective rental rate of capital; but with CRS a consumption tax does
not work since it has no general equilibrium eect on the oil price and does not aect the mar-
ket power of the dominant rm. That is, with constant returns to scale the consumption tax
introduces an additional distortion without at all addressing the one already in place.
The above result can be overturned if oil is produced under decreasing returns to scale, as
would be the case with a xed factor of oil production. Suppose that capital in oil production





where  < 1 and Zt grows so as to ensure the balanced growth path property.
In this case, the welfare of the oil importer is maximized when the oil consumption tax is
as high as 115% ( = 1:15). As before, a positive oil consumption tax reduces oil consumption
and induces a shift towards more nal goods consumption and leisure. Dierently from the case
with constant returns to scale, however, this time part of the tax ends up being paid eectively
by the dominant oil rm, whose prots are squeezed by the negative eect of the tax on the
price. This result is reminiscent of Bergstrom (1982)'s analysis of the possibility of capturing
oil rents with a national excise tax in the context of a model of xed oil endowment extracted
at zero cost.
6. Conclusions
A closer look at the international oil market reveals an industrial structure which is quite
dierent from the perfect competition paradigm. A single rm accounts for more than 10% of
global oil supply. This rm restricts investment, maintains spare capacity, and reacts strongly
to supply shocks aecting other oil producers. Much of the informal discussion about the role
of Saudi Aramco as a \swing producer" focuses on its alleged \stabilization objectives" based
on non-economic, e.g. foreign-policy, considerations.
We show that the same facts can be accounted for quantitatively by a fairly standard model
of a dominant rm with competitive fringe. In our model, it is in the dominant rms' own
interest to increase output when fringe production is hit by a negative shock. The osetting
is incomplete by design, as it is optimal to let the oil price rise in tandem with the rm's oil
output.
We use our model to quantify the distortion from the presence of a dominant oil rm. While
the loss for oil importers is non-negligible, we nd no easy solution through taxes in the oil-
importing region, or subsidies to fringe producers. Indeed, the only way such measures could
work is by capturing some of the rents of the dominant oil rm by reducing its market power. But
it is the dominant rm which is endowed with the low-cost oil production technology, and hence
shifting resources away from it comes at the cost of lower oil production eciency. Importantly,
our analysis of oil taxation ignores the environmental impact of oil usage as well as the nancial
linkages among oil exporters and oil importers, two key issues which we leave for future research.19
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Tables and gures
Table 1. Output, reserves, and spare capacity of the top 10 oil companies
Company Country State-owned Output Reserves Spare capacity
(%) (mbd) (bil. barrels) (% of global supply)
Aramco Saudi Arabia 100 10.4 264.2 3.9
NIOC Iran 100 4.4 138.4 0.3
Pemex Mexico 100 3.5 12.2 -
CNPC China 100 2.8 22.4 -
Exxon Mobil US 2.6 11.1 -
KPC Kuwait 100 2.6 101.5 0.5
PdVSA Venezuela 100 2.6 99.4 0.3
BP UK 2.4 10.1 -
INOC Iraq 100 2.1 115.0 0.1
Rosneft Russia 75 2.0 17.5 -
Sources: Smith (2009), Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (December 4, 2008), and World Energy Outlook,
International Energy Agency (2009)
Table 2. Data and model averages
% Saudi Oil/GDP Oil price Oil output Final output
share share growth growth growth
Data 12.3 5.0 2.21 0.78 2.98
Model 12.7 5.4 2.21 0.77 3.00
Table 3. Data and model standard deviations*
Oil Oil Fringe Saudi Final
price output output output output
Data 8.5 1.7 1.5 6.9 0.7
Model 8.3 1.2 1.8 6.4 1.2
*Standard deviations, in percentage points, of rst log dierences.22
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Figure 1: Oil output (tbpd) by six large OPEC producers, 1973-2009
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Figure 2: Responses to an oil supply and an oil demand shock23
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Figure 4: The eects of a subsidy to fringe investment24
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Figure 5: The eects of an oil consumption tax25
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Proof. Since there are no barriers to entry in the competitive fringe, fringe producers must
earn zero proﬁts. Thus, the real price of oil must equal the marginal cost of the competitive
fringe,




˜ Zt˜ γ˜ γ(1 − ˜ γ)1−˜ γ

. (17)
The same formula replacing hats with tildes gives the marginal cost of the dominant producer,




ˆ Ztˆ γˆ γ(1 − ˆ γ)1−ˆ γ

. (18)





In steady-state the above expression reduces to (10), noticing that the steady-state rental
price of capital, pinned down by preferences and technology, is the same across oil producers.
Corollary 4
Proof. In the symmetric case (˜ γ =ˆ γ), the average oil price markup (10) reduces to μ = ˆ Z0/ ˜ Z0.
The dominant producer will thus be proﬁtable if and only if ˆ Z0 > ˜ Z0.
Proposition 7
Proof. Taking the investment subsidy into account, the markup of the dominant ﬁrm is
μ =Υ( gz/β − (1 − δ))
ˆ γ−˜ γ (1 + φ)
1−˜ γ . (20)
Solving this for φ while setting μ = 1 yields expression (14).
Appendix B: Equilibrium conditions of the dominant ﬁrm
Production function, capital accumulation equation, and resource constraint:





ˆ Kt =( 1− δ) ˆ Kt−1 + ˆ It (22)
ˆ Ct = st ˆ Ot − ˆ It − ˆ Xt (23)
First-order conditions of the maximization problem:
λ3t = λ2tst (1 − ˜ γ) (24)
ˆ Ot = λ1tO
η
t − λ2t˜ γ ˜ Ot + λ4t (O
η
t + νtOt) (25)
0=ηstO
η−1
t (λ1t + λ4t)+λ3t + λ4tνtst (26)










(1 − ˆ γ)
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